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Secure multi-party computationa b s t r a c t
Objective: Some phase 1 clinical trials offer strong ﬁnancial incentives for healthy individuals to partic-
ipate in their studies. There is evidence that some individuals enroll in multiple trials concurrently.
This creates safety risks and introduces data quality problems into the trials. Our objective was to con-
struct a privacy preserving protocol to track phase 1 participants to detect concurrent enrollment.
Design: A protocol using secure probabilistic querying against a database of trial participants that allows
for screening during telephone interviews and on-site enrollment was developed. The match variables
consisted of demographic information.
Measurement: The accuracy (sensitivity, precision, and negative predictive value) of the matching and its
computational performance in seconds were measured under simulated environments. Accuracy was
also compared to non-secure matching methods.
Results: The protocol performance scales linearly with the database size. At the largest database size of
20,000 participants, a query takes under 20 s on a 64 cores machine. Sensitivity, precision, and negative
predictive value of the queries were consistently at or above 0.9, and were very similar to non-secure ver-
sions of the protocol.
Conclusion: The protocol provides a reasonable solution to the concurrent enrollment problems in phase
1 clinical trials, and is able to ensure that personal information about participants is kept secure.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under theCCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Although altruism is often considered the primary motive for
patients to participate in clinical trials, many phase I clinical trials
rely on healthy volunteers [1]. According to DeMets et al. [20], clin-
ical trials involving new drugs are commonly classiﬁed into several
phases (labeled 0 to 5), which can span many years. Phase 1 clinical
trials usually involve testing a drug on 20–100 healthy volunteers
to determine whether the drug is safe (at certain dosages) to
further check for efﬁcacy on a larger scale. In the case of healthy
volunteers, the main reason for participation is monetary compen-
sation [3,4,7,19,27,34,35,44,70]: individuals are attracted to thepromise of large sums for seemingly little effort or skill needed
on their part. Unlike patients, there are no potential beneﬁts that
healthy volunteers might gain from the drug or intervention that
is being tested on them. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
compensation provided by those running the trials is the main rea-
son that healthy volunteers choose to participate. Some argue that
providing monetary compensation to participants could result in
coercion to the poor and those in need [22,26,27,49,51,67,71].
Others argue that it is only fair to compensate healthy research
subjects because they gain no other beneﬁt from their participa-
tion [25,49,50].
From a research perspective, it appears that without monetary
compensation, it would not be possible to recruit a sufﬁcient num-
ber of healthy volunteers to ﬁll the growing demand
[3,4,7,19,34,35,44,70]. It has become more common for healthy
volunteers participating in phase I clinical trials to earn at least
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ground culture represented by publications like Guinea Pig Zero
to assist those looking for trials to participate in [25] and websites
that inform subjects of phase I trials available in their area [22].
Volunteering for well-paying studies may not in and of itself be
detrimental. However, of concern to researchers, trial managers,
contract research organizations (CROs), and regulatory bodies is
the possibility that some research subjects may enroll in clinical
trials concurrently [22,27,34,35,70] or sequentially without regard
to the appropriate ‘‘cleansing’’ or ‘‘washout’’ period between tri-
als—a period of at least 30 days, and up to many months depending
on the trial/intervention [3,7,27,34,35,44,70].
The practice of engaging in studies as an ‘overlapping trial par-
ticipant’ can lead to nontrivial problems for phase I trials. These
include introducing error and bias into the results of the trial,
and an unnecessary early stop of the study due to elevated adverse
events.
The potential for error and bias in the results may be higher in
trials that include overlapping trial participants. The act of partic-
ipating in a clinical trial can affect a subject both physically and
mentally [22,26,35,44,51,65,67]. There are drug effects, or physical
effects due to the intervention, that can potentially endure after
the trial has ended [35]. These practices can lead to greater risk
to the participant as well as greater potential bias to the results
of the studies. A correlation has been found between reported
adverse events and repeat participation, ﬁnding that adverse
events were more common in those with a longer history of trial
participation [35]. A safe drug could be deemed unsafe, or worse,
an unsafe drug could be deemed safe due to the interaction
between drugs. This raises questions on whether participants’
experiences work to bias the results. Will lasting drug effects carry
over to the next trial? Will any omissions or untruthfulness result
in harm to the subject or inaccuracy in the results? [27,67].
In clinical trials, stopping rules are typically deﬁned in the study
protocol to limit the amount of harm to participants [45]. If a per-
centage of serious adverse events is observed which exceeds the
predeﬁned limit, the trial is stopped early. Phase I trials typically
involve the ﬁrst introduction of a new drug to humans, and are test-
ing for the maximum tolerable dosage [59]. These trials involve a
small number of participants, and continuation of the trial is based
on observed toxicity of the drug. To limit harm to participants, the
acceptable level of toxicity is determined ahead of time. If partici-
pants do not show signs of toxicity, the drug dose is increased, if
they do then the trial is stopped. Because of the small cohorts of
participants in phase I trials, a very small number of individuals
experiencing adverse events can have a signiﬁcant impact on the
overall outcomes of the study and may result in an unnecessary
early stop. An early stop could lead to an under-dosage in future
studies of the same compound, diluting its therapeutic effect.
Participants trying to be enrolled in multiple overlapping trials
have adopted various strategies to increase the chances of being
accepted. For instance, through their participation in trials, experi-
enced participants may learn what criteria researchers are looking
for in a subject and how to behave within a trial to be considered a
‘good subject’. It has been suggested that once a person enrolls in a
second study, they have the experience needed to appear as a good
participant to ensure that they are retained in the trial and obtain
the promised ﬁnancial reward [4,22,26,51,65]. It has also been
identiﬁed that some participants choose to withhold information
or can be untruthful about the information that they provide to
increase the chances of being screened in, for example, by taking
measures to ensure that drugs will not be detected in the screening
tests (by exercising or taking herbal remedies) [27,65]. Not all
‘overlapping trial participants’ withhold information or are
untruthful, but current evidence shows that dishonesty among
these individuals is not uncommon [4,8,22,26,27,35,44,51,65,79].According to ethical and legal guidelines regulating the conduct
of research with human subjects, investigators are obliged to pro-
tect research participants from harm [38,54,58]. This holds true for
all participants, even those who are not completely honest about
their past or current participation in trials.
As noted in the review in Appendix A, where tracking systems
have been deployed, there is evidence that between 0.9% and
almost 9% of volunteers are concurrently or have recently enrolled
in a trial [8,35,58,79]. However, knowledge of the existence of a
tracking system may have resulted in fewer overlapping partici-
pants attempting to enroll [8,58], meaning that these numbers
should be seen as a ﬂoor.
At the time of writing, the median enrollment for the 19,571
phase 1 clinical trials in clinicaltrials.gov was 33. If, say, 1% of par-
ticipants in phase 1 trials are concurrently or have recently partic-
ipated in other trials, it would mean that 1 in 3 trials are at risk of
elevated adverse events unrelated to the compound under investi-
gation, on average.
Therefore, for practical and ethical reasons it is important to
identify such overlapping trial volunteers and exclude them from
participating.
Organizations and sites that run phase 1 clinical trials have
attempted to manage this problem by creating comprehensive reg-
isters of all participants in trials within a particular geographic area
[8,79]. For example, one system used in Florida retains ﬁngerprint
(biometric) information about participants so that individuals can
be checked against the database when they volunteer for a new
trial [8]. In some cases, if a participant is found to be enrolled in
overlapping trials they are excluded from those trials as well as
any future trials within the institution or even the geographic
region [79]. The creation of comprehensive tracking databases with
personally identifying information about trial participants that are
shared among multiple phase I sites creates privacy risks for the
participants and regulatory risks for the sites. For example, if there
is a data breach at the database the personal details of all those
participating in trials would be exposed.
In this paper we describe a secure protocol for tracking individ-
ual participants across multiple sites without creating an identity
database holding information in the clear. The protocol allows sites
to identify those individuals who participate in multiple trials con-
currently but also provides strong privacy guarantees to the
participants.2. Methods
In this section we describe the secure protocol for tracking trial
participants. The basic conﬁguration is that there are multiple
phase 1 sites that are members of a consortium, and all members
of this consortium contribute information about the participants
in their phase 1 trials to a central database (CD). The consortium
members need to be within a small geographic distance of each
other (e.g., a metropolitan area) since volunteers will not generally
travel long distances to enroll and participate in multiple trials.
When a site needs to check if a particular participant is concur-
rently enrolled in another trial within the consortium, they would
run a query against the CD.
Checking against the CD proceeds in two steps that are consis-
tent with the typical screening workﬂow for phase 1 clinical trials.
In the ﬁrst step individuals contact the site and volunteer over the
telephone (they have usually heard about the study through adver-
tisements or friends and acquaintances, or sometimes they are
contacted directly by the site because they had volunteered for
studies there in the past and were considered a good candidate).
Those who pass the telephone screening are invited to come to
the site for additional tests. These additional tests may include
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tests on blood and urine that is collected at the site.
In the second step, volunteers are screened again when they
come for the visit to the site. This ensures that they have not
enrolled in other studies since the telephone interview, and they
are asked to provide documentation to conﬁrm their identity and
other demographic information used for the query.
2.1. Requirements
Below we provide a set of basic requirements for an efﬁcient
privacy preserving protocol that can be used to track phase 1
participants:
1. The protocol should not create a database with participant
identity information in the clear. The operator of the CD must
never know the identity of the participants in the database,
and if the CD is compromised it should not be possible for an
adversary to determine the identity of the participants.
2. The sites must be able to query the CD and only learn whether
the volunteer information provided in the query matches a par-
ticipant in the CD. Sites must not be able to view or access all
records in the CD.
3. The site queries should allow exact matching (e.g., on health
insurance card numbers) or approximate matching (e.g., for
names).
4. In practice many sites are computationally constrained, and
therefore any secure protocol should minimize the computa-
tional and communication requirements of the sites.
These requirements provided a framework for evaluating exist-
ing protocols and designing our own protocol.
2.2. Existing protocols
There are several approaches that have been used in the past for
matching patients or querying patient databases securely: secure
equijoin, secure set intersection, private information retrieval,
splitting strings into q-grams, Bloom ﬁlters, using reference tables,
Sparse Map, and phonetic encoding. We examine examples of
these types of protocols below.
In the secure equijoin protocol by Agrawal et al. [2], each of the
two parties has her own unencrypted dataset. Using a hash func-
tion and commutative encryption they propose a number of secure
protocols including computing the equijoin, set intersection, and
set intersection size of the two datasets. There is no third party
involved in these protocols. Their protocols, however, require both
parties to perform computations on the other’s encrypted records.
Applying their protocol to our setting, therefore, would require
sites to perform signiﬁcant computations on the encrypted records
of the CD, which does not ﬁt with our fourth requirement.
A generalization of the Agrawal et al. protocol by O’Keefe et al.
uses a different topology [53]. Here there are two data custodians
with databases holding information about overlapping individuals,
and a third entity that wants to receive a linked data set without
the protocol revealing personal information. In this protocol all
parties must also perform signiﬁcant computations, which would
not meet our requirements.
Freedman et al. [31] proposed a private record linkage protocol
in which a user generates a polynomial setting the roots to items in
her dataset, and sends the encrypted coefﬁcients to a server. For
each ﬁle in the server’s dataset, the server homomorphically eval-
uates the user’s polynomial and returns the encrypted result to the
user. The user decrypts and checks the result: if the server’s record
is contained in the user’s database, the polynomial evaluates to 0.
The result is a random number otherwise. There is no third party inthis protocol. Like Agrawal et al., applying this solution to our set-
ting would require sites to perform computations on the entirety of
CD’s encrypted database, and thus does not meet our limited com-
puting capacity requirements.
Private information retrieval is a set of methods that allow a
user to retrieve an item from a server owning a database without
revealing the retrieved item to the database owner [10].
Therefore, it is assumed that the dataset in the server is not
encrypted. This is also the case in the symmetric private informa-
tion retrieval [48], in which privacy is preserved for both the
Sender and the Receiver. That is, on the one hand the Sender
should not learn any information about the index of the record
the Receiver is interested in, and on the other hand, the Receiver
should not learn any information about the database, beyond the
content of the record deﬁned in the query.
Churches and Christen [16] presented a protocol that requires
splitting a string into q-grams, i.e., a group of smaller strings based
on consecutively splitting the original string into smaller groups.
Each string would be represented by a power set of its subgroups.
Each q-gram would be hashed using a common secret key for the
two database owners. These owners create collections with the
group of q-grams, the number of q-grams in the group, and the
total number of q-grams, and then send them to a third party for
matching. The authors also recommend inserting dummy q-gram
groups in order to prevent frequency attacks. This protocol has a
large communication and computational cost [14] because it relies
on power sets of q-grams [15,72] and is still susceptible to fre-
quency attacks for the groups of q-grams of size one [11,69].
Schnell et al. [63] presented a 3-party protocol for private
record linkage based on Bloom ﬁlters. When comparing string
ﬁelds, the authors split the string into q-grams that are then
hashed using a number of different hash functions to calculate
indices in the Bloom ﬁlter, which will be set to one. The third party
will compare Bloom ﬁlters using the dice coefﬁcient approach. The
authors claim that their method produces similar results to
non-encrypted identiﬁers and is superior to phonetic encoding.
However, they do face the risk of frequency attacks especially
against short names.
Durham improved on the Bloom ﬁlter technique of Schnell et al.
[63]. Her technique is more secure by random bit sampling from
attributes: instead of building a separate Bloom ﬁlter for each ﬁeld
in the record, Durham suggests representing the entire record in a
single Bloom ﬁlter [23]. She suggests that her method makes fre-
quency attacks less likely because the domain from which the sin-
gle ﬁlter is constructed is much larger than separate domains for
separate ﬁlters. She suggests a private blocking method based on
Bloom ﬁlters locality sensitive hashing (LSH). She describes LSH as
a method that can map objects into partitions in a way that similar
objects will share a partition with a high probability while different
ones will not. A hamming distance method (number of positions at
which strings differ) is used to create partitions from the Bloom ﬁl-
ters record encodings. Durham suggests that it is not obvious how
an attacker can use the properties of the partitions to determine
information about the plain text values, but does not provide a
solid privacy guarantee.
Randal et al. [57] use the same Bloom ﬁlter method developed
by Schnell, but they don’t show that it satisﬁes the recommenda-
tion of Kuzu for privacy protection against cryptanalysis. They
make the size of the Bloom ﬁlter smaller and reduce the number
of hash functions (both by 10), using a 100 bit Bloom ﬁlter instead
of 1000 and 3 hash functions instead of 30. There is no discussion
of the security of their Bloom ﬁlter design. They use bigrams to
populate it though they have also tried it with trigrams and it gave
similar results. The blocking they use is by hashing the soundex
[61] of the surname with ﬁrst initial but the soundex mostly
applies to the beginning of a name so it is questionable if adding
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which can lead to statistical attacks.
Pang and Hansen [55] suggested a protocol where two database
owners agree on a set of common reference strings. Each party will
compare each appropriate identiﬁer from each record to the entire
set of reference strings. The comparison produces a distance value.
If that distance is less than a chosen threshold, the corresponding
reference string is encrypted and added to a group containing an
identiﬁer number and the distance value. Each identiﬁer is repre-
sented by a series of groups as deﬁned earlier. Both parties send
their groups to a third party that will compare them against each
other. To classify two identiﬁers as a match, their distances from
a common reference string should be below a speciﬁed minimum
value. The performance and accuracy of this protocol is variable: it
is based on the selection of the set of reference strings. Bachteler
et al. conducted an empirical study that showed this protocol has
poor precision and recall and requires longer run times than other
protocols in the literature [5].
Scannapieco et al. [62] argued that cryptographic protocols are
inefﬁcient and proposed an efﬁcient protocol that embeds the
strings of the records to be matched in a vector space. The space
is built from random strings and strings from the records are
embedded using the Sparse Map method [37]. Both database own-
ers send their vectors to a third party that compares them using
the standard Euclidean distance between them. To make the proto-
col more efﬁcient, using Sparse Map, the authors reduce the space
dimension by applying a greedy re-sampling method and by dis-
tance approximations. However, the methods to achieve the per-
formance gains negatively affect the accuracy of the protocol.
Another problem with this protocol is that the third party will be
able to mount a statistical attack based on the data it receives [33].
Karakasidis et al. [42] suggested a method using phonetic
encoding to account for typing mistakes, coupled with encryption
for privacy. The method also injects fake phonetic codes to
protect against frequency attacks. However, phonetic encoding
yields more false positive matches than string similarity
functions [32].
The closest protocol that can address the problem described
here is the secure equijoin proposed by Kantarcioglu et al. [40].
In that protocol it is assumed that two data providers have already
submitted their encrypted records to a data storage site. After sub-
mitting a query from a client to the data storage site, the data stor-
age site will compute the join of the two data sets and will send the
results to the key holder, who owns the private key of the cryp-
tosystem. The key holder will decrypt the match results to ﬁnd
the matches, and will send the ﬁnal result to the client. This proto-
col has a conﬁguration which is different from our problem (i.e., it
assumes a researcher is trying to match records in two indepen-
dent databases rather than running a query against a database)
and does not consider probabilistic matching.
Yakout et al. [78] build on the protocol of Scannapieco et al. [62]
and try to optimize it by reducing the number of candidate pairs to
be compared. They do not require a third party. However, the use
of the secure scalar product protocol to do the comparisons
requires extensive computations and thus rendering their
two-party protocol less efﬁcient than its predecessor [62]. Yakout
et al. developed a new protocol [77] that has acceptable perfor-
mance for large datasets but it is only capable of handling string
ﬁelds at the moment. Their experimental evaluation was limited
to datasets that contain only the ﬁrst name and last name ﬁelds.
Karapiperis and Verykios [43] provide a technique based on
Bloom ﬁlters and a homomorphic matching technique. On top of
the privacy concerns over Bloom ﬁlters, their protocol also requires
a trusted third party which could present additional drawbacks in
terms of administrative approval when it comes to healthcare data
because it is difﬁcult to earn trust then it comes to highly sensitiveinformation. We don’t consider a protocol requiring a trusted third
party for use in a real-world scenario.
Wen and Dong [75] present two protocols based on Bloom ﬁl-
ters and garbled Bloom ﬁlters (an element is ﬁrst split into multi-
ple shares then the shares are inserted in the ﬁlter) for exact
matching and approximate matching. While these protocols prove
to be efﬁcient for large databases, the Bloom ﬁlter data structure
has been subjects to many recent successful attacks and the pri-
vacy provided under this structure is questionnable.
Though using Bloom ﬁlters has growing interest in the litera-
ture, it has also been shown that such ﬁlters are not mature enough
to provide privacy guarantees. Kuzu et al. [47] presented the ﬁrst
cryptanalysis attack on Bloom ﬁlter encodings and showed that
they were able to recover some the names in a database correctly.
Researchers at the German Record Linkage Center [52] claim that
little research on the security of Bloom ﬁlters has been published
and present an attack that requires less computational effort and
less resources than the one presented in [47] to be successful.
They also offer techniques to make their attack more difﬁcult to
achieve but not infeasible. While the two attacks in [47] and [52]
were based on Bloom ﬁlters that encode only one ﬁeld at a time,
and some researchers claiming that encoding more than one ﬁeld
in the Bloom ﬁlter makes it harder to be decoded, Kroll and
Steinmetzer [46] present the ﬁrst successful automated attack on
Bloom ﬁlters encoding more than one identiﬁer. In light of these
recent attacks that are evolving and becoming less computation-
ally demanding, we do not recommend that Bloom ﬁlters be used
at the moment where strong privacy guarantees are required. The
medical domain requires a strong privacy measure because patient
and participant data is of a very sensitive nature and is the subject
of many laws.
2.3. TRACK protocol
Our TRACK protocol allows the tracking of participants to
ensure that they do not enroll in multiple concurrent trials. For
the purpose of our description we assume that a concurrent trial
is one where the washout period has not passed from when a par-
ticipant has completed the trial. This can be easily extended to
incorporate other criteria, such as volume of blood drawn during
the trial, without loss of generality. In the healthcare context, orga-
nizations that agree to share information in a privacy preserving
way are both beneﬁting from that arrangement. In such a situation,
it may be reasonable to design a protocol based on a semi-honest
adversary model [33]. The semi-honest adversary model assumes
that all parties will follow the protocol steps but could try to learn
as much information as possible from the data they are given. On
the other hand, a malicious adversary model takes into considera-
tion that a party may modify, spoof, or send wrong information on
purpose in order to break the protocol and uncover conﬁdential
data.
There are three roles in this protocol:
The Key Holder (KH). This is a semi-trusted third party who gen-
erates the key pairs and performs computations on intermedi-
ate results.
Central Database (CD). The CD holds the encrypted data from all
of the sites and processes queries with the KH.
Sites. The sites provide information about their participants and
execute queries to determine whether a volunteer is enrolled in
a concurrent trial.
The KH role is not strictly necessary if sites and the CD can com-
municate in the context of a traditional two-party protocol in
which both parties perform computations on each other’s
encrypted data. In our setting, however, sites do not receive any
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capacity (requirement 4), making KH a necessary facilitator of
the secure computation.
The protocol has three phases: initiation, screening, and recruit-
ment. During initiation the keys are exchanged. Screening allows
sites to query the CD. Recruitment allows the sites to add new
recruits in the CD. Our protocol utilizes a homomorphic cryptosys-
tem which is described below. A detailed security analysis of this
protocol is provided in Appendix A.
2.3.1. The Elgamal cryptosystem
Throughout the protocol we make use of the exponential
variant of the Elgamal public-key encryption scheme [18], which
we will brieﬂy review here.
2.3.1.1. Parameter Selection and Key generation. Let p; q be large
primes such that p ¼ aqþ 1 for some a > 1. Current recommenda-
tions on the size of these parameters are jpjP 2048 bits and
jqjP 224 bits [68]. Select g to be an element generating the prime
order cyclic sub-group Gq, i.e., 2 6 g < ðp 1Þ and gq  1 mod p.
The key holder selects a random x 2R Zq and computes
y ¼ g x mod p:
The public parameters are p; q; g. The key holder’s private key is x
and the public key is y.
2.3.1.2. Encryption. Let m 2 Zq be the message to be encrypted. To
encrypt a message, the sender selects a random r 2R Zq and
computes
EncðmÞ ¼ c ¼ hc1; c2i ¼ hgr mod p; gmyr mod pi:2.3.1.3. Decryption. Given c ¼ hc1; c2i the key holder computes
decryption DecðcÞ ﬁrst by computing
cx1  c2
¼ grx  gmþrx
¼ gm
The key holder then computes
m ¼ logggm:
This last step is equivalent to solving a discrete logarithm in Gq,
which is a hard general, but can be efﬁcient when the message
space jMj is sufﬁciently small. For our application, this condition
is satisﬁed: we are only ever interested in whether m0 ¼ g0 or not.
2.3.1.4. Additive Homomorphisms. One especially useful property of
the exponential variant of Elgamal is the following additive
homomorphism:
Encðm1Þ  Encðm2Þ ¼ Encðm1 þm2 mod qÞ
This scheme also exhibits a useful scalar multiplicative
homomorphism:
Encðm1Þm2 ¼ Encðm1 m2 mod qÞ
These homeomorphisms are useful in the sense that protocol partic-
ipants can perform arithmetic operations on encrypted values.
Elgamal is known to be semantically secure, providing the prop-
erty that similar (or equivalent) message will encrypt to indepen-
dent ciphertexts. For example, encrypting the same message twice
will, with overwhelming probability, produce different
random-looking ciphertexts. This is important to ensure that an
adversary would not be able to compare an encrypted messageto a dictionary and would not be able to perform a frequency
attack.
We assume that all communications among the parties in this
protocol occur through a secure channel (e.g., SSL), and are authen-
ticated and digitally signed.
2.3.2. Field selection
Private record linkage protocols typically aim to match records
using a wide range of ﬁelds including names, addresses, and other
demographic information. Our initial datasets were composed of
six ﬁelds, typically available in healthcare: ﬁrst name, last name,
gender, date of birth, health card number, and postal code. These
ﬁelds were used to match participant identities.
In order to compare text ﬁelds, it is known that approximate
comparison techniques perform better than exact matching
because they allow for small errors that can be introduced through
a typing mistake. The best approximate matching techniques rely
on splitting a text into a series of consecutive characters and calcu-
lating a similarity index to decide if the entire text is classiﬁed as a
match or not. The implication of this comparison scheme on pri-
vate protocols is the added complexity of encrypting and decrypt-
ing every subset of a text instead of the entirety of the text.
In our datasets, we calculate the computational time required to
match one record against the dataset. Keep in mind that our data-
sets do not contain a full address, which is sometimes included and
used for matching. This means that we are presenting a best case
scenario. The text ﬁelds being matched are ﬁrst name, last name,
and postal code. In our datasets, including the 1990 US census,
the average name length is 7 characters. The postal code is a ﬁxed
6 alphanumeric values in Canada. Therefore the overall text ﬁelds
produce a total of 23 bigrams to be encrypted on average (typically
the ﬁelds are padded with a space at the beginning and at the
end so a name with length x will be represented by x + 1 bigrams.
In our case, ﬁrst name + last name + postal code produces
7 + 1 + 7 + 1 + 6 + 1 = 23 bigrams). The maximum size of a dataset
we considered for our clinical trial setup is 20,000. If a protocol
performed one to one matching, in a worst case scenario, it would
have to perform 20,000 comparisons. This means that we will have
to match (8 ⁄ 8 + 8 ⁄ 8 + 7 ⁄ 7) ⁄ 20,000 = 177 ⁄ 20,000 = 3,540,000
bigrams. We developed an optimized code implementing the expo-
nential ElGamal cryptosystem and our experiments showed that
on average, a decryption required around one millisecond. The
worst case scenario to match a record in that case is roughly one
hour on a machine with a single processor. This computation time
is unacceptable to check the eligibility of a participant in a trial
specially that the participant can be waiting for an answer on the
phone or in person. To address this problem, a more powerful
machine can be used, one that has multiple processors. Typically,
a well-built machine today would have a processor with multiple
cores. Record linkage applications are known to be easily paral-
lelizable. Data centers on the other hand have muchmore powerful
machines but they also cost a lot of money. To do our part in reduc-
ing computational cost, we tried to minimize the number of
bigrams that need to be compared by reducing the number of ﬁelds
required to identify a participant.
Text ﬁelds are a bottleneck for privacy-preserving protocols
that aim to provide higher matching accuracy. In the following,
we calculate the values of the sensitivity for the eight different text
ﬁeld combinations for dataset sizes of 1000, 5000, 10,000, and
20,000 participants in a clinical trial.
The displayed values are the averaged results on 50 different
sub-datasets. The legend indicates the selected ﬁelds with each let-
ter representing a ﬁeld that was included in our protocol. ‘F’ stands
for ﬁrst name, ‘L’ for last name, ‘G’ for gender, ‘D’ for date of birth,
‘P’ for postal code, and ‘H’ for health card number. Combinations
consisting of only one or two ﬁelds are not considered because
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evaluation are based on the lists of doctors from the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) [73] and the list of
lawyers from the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) [74]. The
results for both datasets are comparable.
We eliminated the GDH combination because it has lower sen-
sitivity and negative predictive value than the other combinations,
especially for larger datasets. We also eliminated the FGDH combi-
nation because it performed much worse (by at least 34%) in terms
of precision than the other metrics for a smaller dataset size.
The remaining combinations perform similarly for the three
metrics except for precision, where the LGDHmetric performs con-
siderably better especially on smaller dataset sizes, which is typical
for phase 1 clinical trials. The difference is meaningful: at least 17%
between LGDH and the best one of the remaining metrics for the
CPSO dataset (see Figs. 1–6).
Our goal was to reduce the number of text ﬁelds to the least
amount possible with the least sacriﬁce of accuracy. The experi-
ments above show us that the best ﬁeld combination with the least
amount of text ﬁelds and best accuracy is LGDH. We were hence
successful in building new datasets that contained only four ﬁelds:
last name, date of birth, gender, and health card number. The
reduction of the text ﬁelds by a third allowed our experimental
protocol to gain around 64% improvement in terms of perfor-
mance. Instead of comparing 177 bigrams (ﬁrst name + last
name + postal code) for each record, we only compare 64 bigrams
(last name). For larger datasets, the performance improvement is
important because it translates into shorter wait times for partici-
pants to know whether they are eligible to participate in a trial. If a
party had a machine with a 32-core conﬁguration, they would be
able to check the eligibility of a potential participant in roughly
40 s for a dataset size of 20,000 participants.
2.3.3. Initiation phase
During the initiation phase the KH generates a key pair and
sends the public key to the sites and the CD. Whenever a new site
is added to the consortium it is sent a copy of the public key. This
phase is illustrated in Fig. 7.
2.3.4. Screening phase
During the screening phase a site runs a query against the CD, as
illustrated in Fig. 8.
Initial contact with volunteers is often by telephone. During the
call, the study coordinator would collect basic information about
them. The ﬁelds collected would be: last name, gender, date of













Fig. 1. Sensitivity for CPSO for dnumber (known as the OHIP number in Ontario) as we determined
in Section 2.3.2 to improve performance while maintaining high
accuracy.
After collecting the information over the telephone, the study
coordinator enters the ﬁelds into our system. The system then
encrypts the values using the Elgamal public key and sends these
values as a query to the CD (hexagon 1 in Fig. 8).
The CD performs a secure comparison of the values submitted
by the site to the values stored in its database and sends the
encrypted results to the KH (hexagon 2 in Fig. 8) to determine if
a match exists or not. The values stored in the database have been
encrypted using the same public Elgamal key as the sites. Let there
be N records in the database. Out of these let N0 have a washout
period that is within the date of the query. If the values in the
query match any of these N0 records then that would be considered
a concurrent participant.
The exact protocol for the matching will depend on the type of
ﬁeld. For non-string ﬁelds we use a secure comparison protocol as
follows [41]:
1. Let j index the record in the CD being matched with the values
in the query, and let EðcÞ be the value sent in the query and EðdjÞ
be the value in the database.
2. Given public modulus q, the CD generates a random number
rj 2 Zq.
3. The CD computes xj ¼ ðEðcÞ  EðdjÞ1Þ
rj ¼ Eððc  djÞrj Þ ¼ Eð bdjÞ.
Note bdj ¼ 0 if and only if c ¼ dj. Otherwise bdj is a random num-
ber in Zq.
4. The KH uses the private key to decrypt the xj value. If this value
is equal to zero then the value in the query matches the value in
the database, otherwise it is a non-match.
Following the date matching guidelines used by the National
Death Index [6], the following three matches are attempted for
dates and the dates are considered a match if any of themmatches:
(a) exact month and year of birth, (b) exact month and day of birth,
and (c) exact month and +/ 1 year of birth. Therefore, for DoB
values that are encrypted and sent are day, month, year  1, year,
and year + 1.
The last name is a string ﬁeld and would have to be considered
differently to allow for approximate matching of strings. It is pos-
sible to use phonetic encoding functions, such as Soundex [61] and
NYSIIS [66], and perform exact comparisons as for the other ﬁelds.
This generally tends to be robust in case of spelling mistakes





















































































Fig. 4. Precision for LSUC for different string ﬁeld combos.
K. El Emam et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 57 (2015) 145–162 151disadvantages. The ﬁrst is the high percentage of false matches [9].
The second issue is that they are not robust when there are errors
in the initial character or because of truncation variations [16]. For
instance, a unique code, C623, is generated for three names,
‘‘Christine’’, ‘‘Cristina’’, and ‘‘Christopher’’, while each of ‘‘Chris’’
and ‘‘Kristine’’ generate different codes, C620 and K623 respec-
tively. We therefore use an approximate matching approach. Inthis case the string ﬁelds are converted into bi-grams and these
are encrypted individually. For example, if the last name has s
characters, these are encrypted as Eðlast name1Þ; Eðlast name2Þ;
. . . ; Eðlast namesÞ. These are then transmitted, sorted lexicographi-
cally, to the CD. We call this new last name representation scheme
Health Card Number Interleaving (HCN In). The following steps are





























































Fig. 6. Predictive value for LSUC for different string ﬁeld combos.
Fig. 7. Initiation phase where the KH sends out the public key to the different parties.
152 K. El Emam et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 57 (2015) 145–1621. All unique bigrams for the volunteer’s last name are generated
using a character from the last name and a digit from the health
card number. If the health card number digits are not enough tocover the length of the name, we restart from the ﬁrst digit after
reaching the last one (the documentation of the Febrl [13] tool
has reviews of the types of real-world errors that happen in
Fig. 8. Telephone screening phase where the site submits a query to the central server.
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character substitutions. This scheme performs well in handling
these errors and other types as shown in Section 3).
– Let the number of bigrams in the query be s with a maxi-
mum value of 16 (based on experimentation, the limitation
to 16 bigrams performs almost identically to an unconstraint
number of bigrams, the method of choice of the 16 bigrams
was varied between the ﬁrst 16, last 16, random 16, most or
least common 16 but did not show any differences experi-
mentally). This constraint guards against analysis attacks
on very long names that are rare.
2. All values of EðciÞ where i 2 f1; . . . ; sg are sent to the CD.
3. Let the number of unique bigrams in record j in the database for
the same ﬁeld be z (also limited to 16), and the CD has Eðdk;jÞ
where k 2 f1; . . . ; zg. The CD applies the secure comparison pro-
tocol above to all pairs of bigrams in the query and record j.
There will be s z encrypted comparison results xi, where
i 2 f1; . . . ; s zg.
4. CD adds a random number of fake bigram comparisons that do
not match any real bigrams (for example two underscores com-
pared to any two letters). This does affect the real number of
common bigrams but prevents the KH from knowing the origi-
nal lengths of the individual names being compared.
5. These cipher texts are sent to the KH, sorted lexicographically.
The CD also sends the KH the sum of the lengths of both names
being compared in order for the KH to compute the dice coefﬁ-
cient [63].
6. The KH decrypts all xi values and computes the Dice coefﬁcient
based on the number of bigrams that matched. If the Dice coef-
ﬁcient is above a certain threshold then this is considered a
match on the last name.
Some recently proposed methods for secure string matching
used Bloom ﬁlters to compare bigrams [64]. However, multiplecryptanalysis attacks revealed that these Bloom ﬁlters are vulner-
able to a frequency analysis under certain conditions [47,52] and
additional attack papers on Bloom ﬁlters are being published.
Our approach would not be vulnerable to such attacks because of
the probabilistic nature of the ciphertexts.
The above protocols for exact matching and string matching
would result in a binary match/nonmatch value for all of the ﬁelds
that are being sent in the query. The KH would have these plaintext
binary values. A probabilistic score can then be computed based on
each comparison result using the Fellegi–Sunter (FS) model [36,30]
(if a ﬁeld value is not available, it could be replaced by an obsolete
value which will not match but the result of the probabilistic
matching on all ﬁelds may still be able to match the record). The
parameters of this model were estimated using the EM algorithm
[39]. If the score is higher than a cutoff then the query is consid-
ered a match, otherwise it is considered a nonmatch. The KH sends
the ﬁnal match/nonmatch result to the site that initiated the query
(hexagon 3 in Fig. 8).
2.3.5. Recruitment phase
When a patient is conﬁrmed recruited the site sends that partic-
ipant’s encrypted information to the CD for storage. The site must
pre-compute all of the bigrams for the strings and the date of birth
variants before encryption. The end of the washout period for that
participant must also be sent, and this value is not encrypted. This
phase of the protocol is illustrated in Fig. 9.
2.3.6. Guards
The queries above contain encrypted forms of an individual’s
demographic information. In order to guard against any potential
attack on this protocol, we suggest the implementation of fake
queries when there is a partial work load on the KH.
Since the KH has the private key and calculates the DC, it has
the biggest learning potential of the parties in the protocol. Some
Fig. 9. Recruitment phase where the site submits the information to be stored in
the CD.
154 K. El Emam et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 57 (2015) 145–162information from the queries are forwarded after processing from
the CD to the KH so the CD knows how much work load it has
passed onto the KH. We suggest that at times when the KH is
not processing too many queries, the CD sends it random queries
to which the sites will ignore the results. This mechanism breaks
the assumption that each calculation the KH is performing is
related to demographic information of an individual wanting to
participate in a trial and so makes any attack on the protocol more
difﬁcult because of the introduction of fake queries that the KH
cannot differentiate from real queries. The system is protected
from being slow because the CD knows the work load it has passed
onto the KH and in general, the KH will not be bombarded with
queries.2.3.7. Extensibility
The protocol uses a limited set of four ﬁelds (last name, gender,
date of birth, and health card number) that were determined to be
efﬁcient and provide good matching accuracy. If a party wishes to
change these four ﬁelds, they are required to perform similar eval-
uations to make sure they do not affect the accuracy of the proto-
col. Ultimately, the last name representation scheme (HCN In) that
we developed cannot be changed. It is a cornerstone of privacy pro-
tection of the protocol: it guards against dictionary and frequency
attacks. Parties wishing to extend this protocol can also add addi-
tional ﬁelds to the evaluation and the results of the matching on
these ﬁelds can be easily included in the Fellegi–Sunter probabilis-
tic evaluation to determine a match based on all ﬁeld comparison
values. Special attention needs to be considered when adding a
new ﬁeld to make sure it will not provide an attacker with a tool
to mount dictionary or frequency attacks based on the new ﬁeld.
Techniques including HCN In can be used to protect ﬁelds with
uneven distribution like the last name ﬁeld against such attacks.2.4. Empirical evaluation
The purpose of the empirical evaluation of the protocol was to
determine how it scales as the CD database size increases in terms
of computation time, and what the accuracy of the probabilistic
matching would be. For the evaluation we developed a optimized
version of the protocol written in C# (see the discussion on opti-
mizations in Appendix A). A 1024 bit key was used for p and a
160 bit key for q (Section 2.3.1), and each processor core used for
performance evaluation was running a Windows XP SP3 operating
system at 2.8 GHz.2.4.1. Data sets
Three data sets were used in our evaluations: name lists from
the 1990 US census provided by the Census Bureau (88,799 unique
last names), ‘‘the CENSUS data’’, a list of members from the College
of Physicians of Ontario (38,295 unique names), ‘‘CPSO data’’, and
the list of members of the Law Society of Upper Canada (26,635
unique names), ‘‘LSUC data’’. We also validated our results with
additional data sets based on the North Carolina voters database
and parts of the Australian phone book. In addition to the names
and gender, we generated random dates of birth and valid health
insurance card numbers (OHIP numbers) such that we had four
ﬁelds for each individual that we used for evaluating our protocol.
We used a tool that introduces realistic optical, phonetic, and
typographical errors into a data set [56,13]. The tool took as input
actual data sources (census, LSUC, CPSO) and produce data sets of
100,000 records that can be used for matching experiments. The
types of modiﬁcations in the generated data sets included mis-
spellings, character insertion, deletion, substitution or transposi-
tion, missing ﬁeld, OCR errors, and phonetic errors. There is
evidence that up to 25% of records have misspellings and typo-
graphical errors in names [76,32]. We therefore introduced errors
to a random subset of 25% records. For each original data set we
created a perturbed version and made that the CD data. The num-
ber of ﬁelds with a perturbation was set to two (i.e., half the ﬁelds
had errors introduced) and the number of errors was limited to one
error per ﬁeld. The records did not have any missing data.2.4.2. Evaluation process and metrics
We created our own tools [28,29] to generate a range of data-
sets supporting the correct prevalence levels of dual enrollers
according to real-world considerations (discussed in Appendix A).
The size of the database in the CD was varied from 1000 to
20,000. This is a reasonable number given that usually phase 1 tri-
als recruit a small number of participants. As noted in the introduc-
tion, the median enrollment for phase 1 clinical trials was 33. A
database with 20,000 participants would amount to 606 trials of
that size that have completed recently within a limited geographic
area. This is arguably a large number of trials and represents a large
database size for our evaluation.
The CD database was sampled from one of the generated (per-
turbed) data sets. We sampled 1000 records from a second gener-
ated data set to simulate the queries. The accuracy and
performance results were computed across the 1000 queries. We
used a prevalence of 2% for participants that are in the CD, which
is consistent with the prevalence range reported in the literature
(as summarized in Appendix A). Prevalence represents the percent-
age of records in the CD that would match the queries. Note that in
general higher values of prevalence tended to have higher accu-
racy, therefore the value we chose erred on the conservative side.
The metrics we computed were sensitivity, precision (also
known as positive predictive value), and the negative predictive
value. To determine whether the secure string matching protocol
had an impact on accuracy, we also compared these metrics with
non-secure string-matching methods using the Levenshtein dis-
tance [36] and the Jaro-Winkler score [36]. The whole evaluation
was performed on 50 independently perturbed data sets and the
above metrics averaged across them.
Computational performance was measured in terms of seconds
to execute the query. The query consisted of encryption at the site,
matching with the database at the CD, and decryption at the KH.
Other computations, such as the EM algorithm, consume negligible
time compared to the cryptographic functions. Communication
was not considered as this would vary depending on network traf-
ﬁc at the time the query was executed, and each query only
requires a ﬁxed 3 messages.
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1000 queries on CD databases of different sizes. For our simula-
tions, we used 32 core and 64 core clusters (16/32 dual core machi-
nes) to represent the KH, and all of the computations were
parallelized [28]. Record matching problems are known to be
easily parallelizable for improved performance [12].
2.4.3. Calibration
The CENSUS data was used for calibration, to ﬁnd optimal cutoff
values for the string comparison metrics: the Dice coefﬁcient [63],
Jaro-Winkler [36], and Levenshtein [36]. In addition, an optimal
value for the probabilistic matching score cutoff was determined
on the CENSUS data set. An optimal value is one that produced high
values on the sensitivity, speciﬁcity, and precision metrics. All sub-
sequent evaluation were performed on the LSUC and CPSO data
sets only.3. Results
The performance results in terms of computation time as the
database size increases are shown in Fig. 10. For a 20,000 individ-
ual database, the total computation time is just under 40 s on 32
cores and under 20 s on 64 cores for a query.
Our objective was to provide an acceptable performance for a
privacy-preserving protocol and we were successful in achieving
that. We also present a comparison of the runtime of the
non-secure methods (dice coefﬁcient without encryption,
Jaro-Winkler, and Levenshtein) versus our method in Fig. 11 that
shows that the non-secure methods are much less expensive in
terms of computations (around 5000 times faster). However, those
methods cannot be used to preserve privacy. We have to pay the
price for privacy, even though it is much larger, it is still acceptable
(40 s on a 32-core machine) and can be used in real-world
applications.
The accuracy results for the three metrics, speciﬁcity, precision,
and negative predictive value against database size are provided in
Figs. 12–14. There are three key observations from these graphs:
(1) there is little difference in accuracy between our secure compu-
tation protocol and one that does not use secure matching on the
last names, except for precision where we perform consistently
better. A high precision value indicates that the protocol disquali-
ﬁes very few individuals incorrectly and this is important because
CROs have a hard time recruiting trial participants. (2) The accu-
racy on the three metrics is quite high at 0.9 for almost all database
sizes. (3) There is generally little variation in accuracy as the data-
base size changes.
Finally, we compared the matching accuracy of our probabilistic
matching technique to an exact matching technique based solely
on matching the health card number. The values for precision
and negative predictive value but the main difference was in terms
of sensitivity. Sensitivity measures the percentage of true matches.
It was expected that our method performs better than exact
matching: on average, the improvement was by 2% but the full
results are displayed in Fig. 15.4. Discussion
External validity [60] determines if the results of a given evalu-
ation can be generalized to other domains and similar use cases. It
was a main consideration while we designed our experimental
evaluations. The risks that we wanted to mitigate in our evalua-
tions included the following: bias in using a dataset from only
one country, bias in introducing typographical errors not represen-
tative of real-world errors, and inaccurate name frequencies in
generated datasets compared to their real-world counterparts.Prevalence was also an important factor for phase 1 clinical trials.
We wanted to measure the accuracy of our protocol given a similar
percentage of individuals that try to enroll in trials concurrently.
We chose to set the prevalence value at 2% because clinical trial
managers reported a concurrent enrolment percentage between
2% and 7% (Appendix A.1) and we discovered from our experiments
with prevalence values between 1% and 10% that higher prevalence
values tend to have better accuracy so we wanted to provide a
worst case scenario with acceptable accuracy numbers.
To address the ﬁrst risk of a dataset from a single country, we
used data sources based on the 1990 US census data, the College
of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) database and the
Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) database. We also included
two additional datasets: the North Carolina voters’ database and
parts of the Australian phone book which produced similar results
in recent validation of our work. Using data sets from Canada, the
United States, and Australia gives us more conﬁdence in the exter-
nal validity of our work in western English speaking countries.
Another threat to external validity is that the populations and
typing mistakes that were generated are not similar to the ones
that exist in real-world cases. To mitigate this threat, we used
the Febrl tool [13] to generate our simulated populations based
on the 1990 US census, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario (CPSO) database, the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC)
database, the North Carolina voters’ database and parts of the
Australian phone book. Febrl has been used by many other
researchers working on the same type of problems. It generates
populations based on the name frequencies in the databases to
simulate real-world populations. The errors introduced by Febrl
are also following the same distribution of real errors in
real-world datasets: insertions, deletions, substitutions, OCR, etc.
To gain conﬁdence in our generated data sets, we analyzed each
data source to extract its name frequencies in order that data sets
closely matched with the real-world versions. Febrl accepted a fre-
quency ﬁle as input and generated populations with names based
on the values of the frequency ﬁle. Based on our analysis of the
original data sets, we created the frequency ﬁles required by
Febrl and used Febrl to generate data sets of similar, smaller, or
bigger sizes that still had similar frequency properties as the orig-
inal data sets.
We created 50 different versions of each data set. The number
50 was chosen as a good reference point based on prior experi-
ments in the Electronic Health Information Laboratory. Our accu-
racy and performance results are the average results of running
each experiment independently over 50 different versions of each
data set.
Lastly, the protocol has not yet been deployed in a real-world
environment. However, we tried our best to mimic a real-world
environment taking into consideration prevalence between the
datasets and real-world errors in generated datasets.
4.1. Limitations
Limitations to the TRACK protocol include the situation where
one of the clinical trial sites in proximity of the others refuses to
be included in the system for detecting dual enrollers: this site
would pose a threat to the concept because all the individuals that
go to that site would not be detected by our protocol. However, we
made the process of a site joining the team very easy: the key
holder sends the new site the public key that is used to contribute
all its records to the central database and it becomes part of the
private matching group as soon as it completes that step.
Additional limitations include the requirement of the four ﬁelds
(last name, gender, date of birth, and health card number) for high
accuracy matching. Other protocols include a larger number of



















Fig. 12. The sensitivity of the TRACK approach for both data sets, compared to distance approaches from Jaro-Winkler and Levenshtein, according to the database size in



































































Fig. 11. Performance comparison of TRACK vs non-secure methods.
156 K. El Emam et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 57 (2015) 145–162missing value in one of the ﬁelds. We determined a minimilistic set
of ﬁelds required for matching but the downside is that for the
quality of the matching to be high, all four ﬁelds need to have
values. We do however support a small mistake in any of the four
ﬁelds because we use a probabilistic matching scheme.
Not all phase 1 trials require healthy volunteers. In most cancer
trials, for example, cancer patients may be the participants. There
is no evidence that patient volunteers engage in concurrent trial
participation. Also, not all phase 1 healthy volunteers get paid.
For example, in some vaccine trials in Canada the participants only
get paid for expenses incurred. In such cases there are noincentives for concurrent trial participation and our protocol may
not be needed.
4.2. Future work
The following items would be interesting and important to
investigate or to perform:
 Deployment of a system based on TRACK to a real group of CROs
to better suit their needs and how to develop a complete solu-




















Fig. 13. The precision of the TRACK approach for both data sets, compared to distance approaches from Jaro-Winkler and Levenshtein, according to the database size in terms
























Fig. 14. The negative predictive value of the TRACK approach for both data sets, compared to distance approaches from Jaro-Winkler and Levenshtein, according to the
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Fig. 15. Comparing the sensitivity of exact matching versus probabilistic matching in the TRACK protocol.
K. El Emam et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 57 (2015) 145–162 157 Evaluation of our methods using datasets from countries using
another language (e.g., French) or alphabet (e.g., Arabic or
Chinese).
 Evaluation of probabilistic matching techniques for every single
ﬁeld if resource constraints are freed with the increased
computation power to be available in the future to increase
the accuracy of the protocol. El Emam et al. [24] developed a protocol that secures the iden-
tity of a data provider in order to monitor the spread of a dis-
ease by aggregating data from several providers (without
revealing their identities) and presenting only the sum of the
results to a health authority. It would be of interest for clinical
trial sites to include that work along the TRACK protocol to
detect concurrent enrollers and report on their numbers
158 K. El Emam et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 57 (2015) 145–162without affecting the credibility of a site (in case it had many
concurrent enrollers).
 Evaluation of the extendibility of the protocol to detect individ-
uals who attempt to obtain a prescription drug several times
from multiple pharmacies.
4.3. Summary
In this paper we have provided a privacy-preserving protocol
for tracking phase 1 clinical trial participants to ensure that there
are no concurrent enrolments with acceptable computational and
accuracy results. The main beneﬁt of such a protocol is that healthy
volunteers in these trials will have a much smaller risk of their
personal information being compromised, compared to current
systems that hold their personal information on centralized
databases accessible over the Internet in the clear. The techniques
presented in the protocol protect the data against dictionary and
frequency attacks. Clinical Trials Ontario [17] presents a report with
a deﬁnition of a technological system for clinical trials. They sug-
gest the usage of a cloud solution because it would be common
to all clinical trial sites as individual sites do not have the technical
expertise to choose and to maintain independent systems. The
system that we presented matches this criterion and enables
clinical trial sites to adopt our protocol with very low overhead.
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Appendix A
A.1. Prevalence of overlapping participants
Boyar and Goldfarb [8] looked at a tracking system deployed by
ﬁve clinical research sites in South Florida. The system that was
developed tracked patients using demographic and biometric iden-
tiﬁers. During the study period, 2081 research volunteers were reg-
istered. All participants were informed of the registry prior to
enrollment. They found that 21.8% of the volunteers enrolled in a
second study within the 18 month period, with 50 (2.4%) trying
to enroll within 30 days of a previous trial and 186 (8.9%) within
60 days [8,58]. Researchers reported that study sites rejected an
additional 10 to 20 subjects who tried to enroll in a second study
before dosing commenced in the ﬁrst trial. The researchers
believed that knowledge of the registry may have discouraged
some participants from attempting to enroll in overlapping trials.
Zanini and Marone [79] piloted a registry system which
included all healthy volunteers participating in drug studies
approved by the central Research Ethics Committee in Southern
Switzerland within a three year period. The total number of volun-
teers involved in clinical trials during this period was 1436. All trial
participants were informed of the registry at the time ofenrollment. The researchers identiﬁed 192 (13.4%) habitual or reg-
ular volunteers who participated in 6–8 successive trials during the
period (with a mandated 30 day waiting period in between). Three
subjects attempted to enroll in overlapping trials during the study
period.
Hermann, et al. conducted a survey of healthy research volun-
teers in Germany [35]. Four hundred and forty people participated
in the survey, 47.1% who were employees of the research centers
and 52.9% who were outside volunteers. A small number of those
surveyed, 2.7%, reported having considered participating in 2 stud-
ies within the restricted period of time (2 months), while 0.9%
reported that they had participated in 2 overlapping trials. Also,
3% of participants reported that they had provided incorrect
answers regarding their medical histories in order to be accepted
by recruiters.
In preparation for developing our secure tracking protocol, we
interviewed 4 phase 1 site managers and study coordinators for
phase 1 trials to understand the issue of volunteers participating
in multiple trials concurrently. During these interviews we asked
for the interviewees’ estimate of the proportion of volunteers
who attempt to enroll in multiple trials concurrently based on
their experiences. The interviewees were recruited by sending invi-
tations to ACRO (Association of Clinical Research Organizations),
CRAC (Clinical Research Association of Canada), and CRO’s
(Contract Research Organizations) in Canada doing phase 1 trials
contacted through an industry list. Our interviewees indicated
that, based on their experiences, between 2% and 7% of screened
volunteers may be participating in other trials.
A.2. Security analysis of TRACK protocol
A.2.1. Security claims
We now state the claims of security of the protocol in the
semi-honest model. Note that the literature provides a discussion
of the security of the secure comparison protocol that we use [41].
Statement 1. It is not possible to do a frequency attack on the
bigrams to determine the original names.Proof. Because the Elgamal cryptosystem is semantically secure,
an adversary would not be able to perform a frequency attack on
the bigrams. Two bigrams that are exactly the same will, in
general, have different ciphertexts. hStatement 2. The protocol correctly evaluates the Dice coefﬁcient
between two names.Proof. The proof is based on the fact that KH receives an encryp-
tion of 0 if the compared bigrams match or an encryption of a
random value otherwise. Knowing the total number of bigrams,
and the number of bigrams that matched is sufﬁcient to compute
the Dice coefﬁcient. hStatement 3. Sites do not learn anything from the protocol, other
than whether their patient is concurrently enrolled in other trials.Proof. By deﬁnition, sites do not receive any communication
except the public key and an indication of whether a double enroll-
ment is detected. hStatement 4. The CD learns nothing from the protocol except the
number of participants recruited by each site.
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other than the public key and the encrypted values associated with
each record (including bigrams) when a site executes a query. The
encryptions are indistinguishable from randomness assuming
Elgamal is semantically secure against chosen-plaintext attack
(i.e., it is IND-CPA secure). The CD knows when a site has recruited
a participant and stores those values in the database, but because
these values are also encrypted it does not know what the values
are. hStatement 5. KH learns nothing from the protocol except the
number of records held by the CD, and the sum of bigrams con-
tained in the records being compared.Proof. By deﬁnition, KH receives no communication, other than
encrypted comparisons of record ﬁelds (including bigrams). A
decrypted comparison equals 0 if the compared ﬁelds matched,
and a random value otherwise. Lexicographical ordering of seman-
tically secure ciphertexts is equivalent to a random shufﬂe of the
associated plaintexts. The sum of the number of bigrams is given
to compute the DC but the KH does not know the individual length
of each name being compared. A maximum of 16 bigrams is com-
puted for each last name in order to prevent the disclosure of rare
names that have more than 16 bigrams. Our bigram generation
strategy prevents the KH from doing statistical analysis on the last
name ﬁeld: since we combine the digits from the health card num-
ber with the letters of the last name, two last names that are the
same will not match in their encrypted form if the health card
number is different. Note though if the health card number has a
small mistake, the match will return true since we are using the
dice coefﬁcient approach. Fake queries were also implemented to
reduce the number of deductions that the KH is able to make about
the number of records that are in reality requested by different
sites in their queries and the content of those queries. hStatement 6. Colluding sites learn nothing about other sites.Proof. This follows directly from Statement 3. hStatement 7. KH colluding with CD results in total disclosure of all
participant identities.Proof. The CD receives encrypted records from all sites. KH has the
secret key required to decrypt them. But this breaks the
semi-honest adversary model that we assume in our protocol.
Therefore it is important to choose the KH and CD as well respected
organizations preferably in different jurisdictions. hStatement 8. Sites colluding with the CD learn nothing about
other sites except how many matches the other site was deter-
mined to have.Proof. Owing to the semantic security of Elgamal, learning the
plaintext/ciphertext pairs of the colluding site gives the CD no
advantage in guessing the plaintexts associated with the cipher-
texts of a non-colluding site. hStatement 9. Sites colluding with the KH only learn the number of
participants matching/nonmatching with records in the CD at
other sites and which ﬁelds exactly match the queries from other
sites, but not the values of the non-matching ones.Proof. Since the KH only receives encrypted results of matching,
and then decrypts them, that is all of the information that a collud-
ing site can learn. This consists of the binary results of comparing
ﬁelds (including the shufﬂed bigrams) and the ﬁnal decision on
whether a query matches or not. hA.2.2. Possible inferences from bigram list length
One concern is whether the CD or KH would be able to deter-
mine the last name by knowing the number of bigrams. A plot of
the distribution of last name bigrams from our data sets is shown
in Fig. 16. Names with too few and many bigrams have low fre-
quency. However, it is only names with 21 and 22 bigrams that
have a low frequency of 3 in our data set. All other names have fre-
quencies higher than 8. We also performed experiments and dis-
covered that limiting the number of bigrams to 16 did not have
any negative effect on the accuracy of our protocol. This limitation
helps conceal the rare long names that have more than 16 bigrams.
We also do not pass the number of bigrams in each ﬁeld to the KH
since it only needs the sum of the number of bigrams in both ﬁelds
being compared, this makes it harder to infer the number of
bigrams in each ﬁeld given our frequency distribution.A.2.3. Dictionary attack on CD
To avoid a site from running a large number of queries (say,
with the assistance of a directory of names such as the White
Pages or by looking at all combinations of ﬁeld values) and deter-
mining the identity of all participants in the CD, the CD may limit
the number of queries that can be executed by a site over time. For
example, it may limit the number of per site queries to 100 per day
and ﬂag a consistently high number of queries over a number of
days. If a site attempts to run more queries than that, then an
administrator would be alerted to investigate.A.3. Optimizing the bigram comparisons
In order to decide if two lists of bigrams match or don’t match,
we calculate the value of the dice coefﬁcient between those two
lists and compare it against a threshold that was determined most
suitable based on experimentation. Consider A as the ﬁrst list of
bigrams and B as the second list of bigrams. The lists contain
unique bigrams.
|X| represents the number of bigrams in list X. The dice coefﬁ-
cient’s formula is the following: DC ¼ 2  jA\BjjAjþjBj.
The CD knows the values of |A|, |B|, and the KH know the value
of |A| + |B| and they both know the threshold for DC. To decide if
the two lists match, we need to ﬁnd out if the dice coefﬁcient is
above or under the threshold. Since we know |A| + |B|, and the
threshold value of DC, we can calculate a threshold value for jA \ Bj.
For a true match the following must be true:
ThresholdðDCÞ <¼ 2  jA \ BjjAj þ jBjjA \ Bj >¼ ThresholdðDCÞ  ðjAj þ jBjÞ
2Let : K ¼ ThresholdðDCÞ  ðjAj þ jBjÞ
2A.3.1. Optimization at the CD
If |A| < K or |B| < K, it is impossible that jA \ BjP K so we don’t
even need to ask the key holder to perform any decryptions. The












Fig. 16. The distribution of the number of bigrams for the last names in our data sets.
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The rule jA \ BjP K must always hold. If the remaining number
of bigrams to compare cannot meet that threshold, we can stop
processing decryptions because at best, if everything else matches,
we still will not be able to reach the threshold.A.4. Deployment considerations
The following are practical considerations necessary when
deploying the TRACK protocol in real world settings:
 Deploying our protocol requires collaboration among multiple
phase 1 sites in a relatively small geographic area. In practice,
participants who are moving among phase 1 trial sites will
not travel large distances. Because the sites that do not track
will become attractive to these professional participants who
enroll on multiple concurrent trials, there is a strong incentive
to join a secure tracking protocol.
 To ensure appropriate consent is obtained, the study coordina-
tors would need to inform individuals that a query will be run
against the CD beforehand. Volunteers who refuse may not be
eligible for the trial.
 In our protocol we used the OHIP number as a ﬁeld. In other
jurisdictions other identiﬁers can be used, such as social secu-
rity number. We did allow for errors in that number, therefore
its inclusion in the protocol does not guarantee perfect matches.
 In practice the CD would purge the N  N0 records that are no
longer within the washout period on a regular basis. This will
ensure that the database does not grow in size, and hence dete-
riorate in performance over time.
 To achieve reasonable performance levels it is necessary for the
CD and KH to deploy a cluster of computers. In our simulations
we used second hand commodity machines with dual cores.
Given the linear performance gain from adding more cores to
the cluster and the ease of parallelizing the computations, it
would be relatively straight forward to gain performance
improvements by simply adding more machines.
 Our protocol uses the KH as a semi-trusted third party. The
main functions of the KH are to decrypt the comparison results
using the private key and perform probabilistic matching com-
putations on these. The use of parties similar to our KH is not
uncommon in secure multi-party computation protocols
[24,40]. The KH can be an academic or commercial site with
strong security, and as noted in [24] it would ideally be located
in a different jurisdiction than the CD and sites to ensure an
additional level of scrutiny for compelled disclosures.A.5. Ethics
Approval from the Research Ethics Board of the CHEO Research
Institute was obtained before conducting the interviews with the
site managers and study coordinators discussed in the earlier part
of this appendix.A.6. Additional material
We provide example code in C# to facilitate the adoption of our
protocol by interested parties. They would also need to obtain the
GnuMP library that is publicly available. The code contains the fol-
lowing components:
 TrialParticipant
– This class holds the information in the clear of a trial
participant.
 EncodedTrialParticipant
– This class holds the encrypted information of a trial partici-
pant including the modiﬁed representation of the last name
(split into bigrams according to the HCN In scheme) and date
of birth (different variations according to the matching crite-
ria of the protocol).
– Objects from this class can be securely sent to the central
database to ﬁnd a match for the participant in a
privacy-preserving manner.
 SiteParticipantEncoder
– This class encrypts the information of a trial participant to
make it ready to be sent to the central database.
– It transforms an object of type TrialParticipant to an object of
type EncodedTrialParticipant.
 ExpElGamalEncryption
– This class holds two values representing the ﬁrst and second
part of the exponential ElGamal encryption.
 CDEncodedParticipantComparison
– This class holds the secure comparison of two
EncodedTrialParticipant objects to be decrypted at the KH
to check for a match.
 CDParticipantComparator
– This class is used by the central database. It creates the
secure comparison of two participants according to the
matching rules for each ﬁeld to be sent to the key holder
to check for a match.
 CDSecureDataComparator
– This class creates a secure comparison of two values in order
to be decrypted and discover if they are equal at the KH.
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– This class utilizes the ElGamal public key to allow the
SiteParticipantEncoder class to encrypt the information of a
trial participant and the CDSecureDataComparator to create
the secure comparisons to be decrypted at the KH.
 KHExpElGamalUtility
– This class belongs at the key holder. It is capable of decrypt-
ing data to check the result of a secure comparison.
 KHParticipantComparator
– This is a main class at the KH. It compares all the trial partic-
ipants to the one in the query by decrypting all the secure
comparisons then performs the Fellegi–Sunter technique
with the Estimation-Maximization steps to ﬁnd out if there
is a match or not.
– This class can decrypt the secure comparison of every ﬁeld
for two encoded trial participants.
 BigInteger
– This class has been developed by a third party and made
freely available to the public for re-use given that its docu-
mentation is also presented.
 TestExpElGamalKeyGenerator
– This class provides sample public and private keys as well as
the parameters for the exponential ElGamal cryptosystem in
order to test it. Note that these parameters should never be
reused on real data.
 Test
– This is a test class to make sure the encodings, decodings,
and comparisons are working properly, and they do.
Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbi.2015.06.019.References
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